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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

KATHY HALL,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d)(2002).
Appellant/Defendant Kathy Hall timely petitioned for interlocutory review of a trial court
order dated April 18, 2006. See Signed Minute Entry being appealed from at R. 180-84,
a copy of which is in Addendum A. This Court granted Ms. Hall's petition for
interlocutory review on the issues set forth below. See this Court's Order granting
interlocutory review in Addendum B.
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue 1: Whether the evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing established
probable cause to believe that Ms. Hall intentionally or knowingly allowed her child to be
"exposed to" paraphernalia, controlled substances or chemical substances so as to justify

bindover on one count of child endangerment where the thirteen-year-old could not see or
access the items in the downstairs bedrooms occupied by adults and the state did not
establish that the debris in the garage or the odor qualified as contraband under the
statute?
Standard of Review: The bindover standard requires that a magistrate bind a case
over for trial if the prosecution introduces sufficient evidence to establish probable cause
to believe that the defendant committed the crime. State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^J17, 137
P.3d 787. The supreme court clarified in Virgin that magistrates may make limited
credibility determinations in preliminary hearings and "may disregard or discount as
incredible evidence that is not capable of supporting a reasonable belief as to an element
of prosecutor's claim." Id. at ff24, 25. Nevertheless, magistrates cannot weigh credible
but conflicting evidence and must limit their credibility determinations to disregarding or
discounting evidence that cannot support a reasonable belief that the defendant
committed the crime charged. Id Because magistrates are able to make limited
credibility determinations, "in reviewing a magistrate's bindover decision, an appellate
court should afford the decision limited deference." Id at ^[26.
Preservation. This issue was preserved below by written motion and argument at a
hearing held April 13, 2006. R. 36-89;10.
Issue 2: Whether the child endangerment statute is void for vagueness as applied
in this case where the thirteen-year-old was in the living room, away from the downstairs
bedrooms and detached garage where items were found, and the evidence did not

establish that the teenager could see or access any items outlawed in the statute or that
she faced any risk of harm?
Standard of Review:

uc

Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of

law, which [are reviewed] for correctness.'" State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, f42, 99 P.3d
820 (further citations omitted). Statutes are presumed constitutional and a party
challenging the constitutionality of a statute "'bearfs] the burden of demonstrating its
unconstitutionality.555 Green, 2004 UT 76, ^J42 (quoting Greenwood v. City of N. Salt
Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991)). Moreover, "[t]he constitution tolerates a greater
degree of vagueness in civil statutes than in criminal statutes.55 Green, 2004 UT 76, ^}43
(citing Vill. Of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)).
Preservation: This issue was preserved by written motion and argument held on
April 13, 2006. R. 36-45; 210.
TEXT OF STATUTE
The texts of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2003) and the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution are in Addendum C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The state.charged Ms. Hall with one count of child endangerment, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2003), and one count of possession
of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5
(2002). R. 01-03.

Following bindover, Ms. Hall filed a "Motion to Quash Bindover/Declare Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 Unconstitutional" and a supporting memorandum. R. 36-50.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion on April 13, 2006. R. 210. The trial court
entered its order denying the motion on April 18, 2006. See Signed Minute Entry in
Addendum A.
Ms. Hall timely petitioned this Court for interlocutory review of the bindover and
constitutional issues, which this Court granted. See Addendum B. This appeal follows.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The state charged Ms. Hall with child endangerment and misdemeanor possession
of paraphernalia after executing a search warrant at a house in Salt Lake County where
Ms. Hall, other adults, and Ms. Hall's thirteen-year-old daughter were present. R. 54,
55, 56. The evidence did not demonstrate that the thirteen-year-old girl ingested, inhaled,
had contact with, accessed, or viewed paraphernalia, a controlled substance or a chemical
substance, but did show items that allegedly were paraphernalia, controlled substance or
chemical substance were found in two downstairs bedrooms and the officer smelled what
he described as the odor of methamphetamine outside and in the detached garage, and
found "debris" that he associated with a methamphetamine lab in the detached garage. R.
56-60.
Officers executed the warrant at about 4:00 p.m. on December 8, 2003. R. 54.
The occupants of the house were in the process of moving out of the house and doors to
all of the rooms were open and people were leaving the house when the officers arrived.
R. 55, 57. Some people were in vehicles and others were in the house. R. 55. Kathy

Hall was at the scene but the officer could not recall whether she was in the house or in a
car. R. 55. Ms. Hall's thirteen-year-old daughter, Tiffany, was in the upstairs living
room area of the house. R. 60. Tiffany was just "hanging around in the living room"
when officers arrived, and did not appear to be helping with the move. R. 63. The
officers detained everyone who was on the scene; the officer who testified thought seven
people were detained. R. 55.
Officers found a pipe on a shelf in a closet in a basement bedroom identified as
Ms. Hall's bedroom. R. 57. The pipe was wrapped in paper or tissue and was not in
plain view. R. 58. The pipe was located in the top of a standard sized closet above the
hanging rod which could hold a winter coat, but was accessible from the front of the
closet and the officer thought that the thirteen-year-old appeared tall enough to reach it.
R. 58, 63. The pipe was never tested even though the officer thought that the pipe was
similar to pipes which are used to ingest methamphetamine and had burn marks and a
smoky residue inside. R. 64, 67-8.
In another downstairs bedroom belonging to Teresa Albretson, the officers found
methamphetamine, a package of pseudoephedrine, a scale, and packaging materials. R.
58, 59, 65. While pseudoephedrine can be used in the production of methamphetamine, it
is an allergy medication and the officers found only one package. R. 60, 65. The items
were inside a transparent plastic set of drawers located in Ms. Albretson's room. R. 58.
There was no evidence the juvenile ever lived in or entered Ms. Albretson's room; in
fact, Tiffany's bedroom was upstairs and she was located in the upstairs living room of
the house when officers arrived. R. 57, 60, 64.

The officers also located "debris55 in the detached garage, including empty bottles
of HEET, black electrical tape, stained rubber gloves, and what the officer described as
"an overwhelming odor of a Methamphetamine lab.55 R. 59. The officers did not find
beakers, iodine or phosphorous in the garage and the gloves were never tested and were
not taken into evidence. R 65, 67. Nor did the officer testify that they found lab waste,
stains, volatile chemicals or methamphetamine in the garage. According to the officer,
HEET can be used "to break up either the pills to separate the efederin [sic] also it can be
used to breakup the glue that is used on the striker plates and the matches to get it to
break up the red phosphorous.55 R. 59. The officer could smell the odor outside the
garage, but could not remember whether he could smell the odor in the house. R. 59.
He also did not know "if there was a garage door on the side, a main door and a main
garage door55 or whether the doors that did exist were locked or unlocked. R. 60.
Although there was no evidence that Tiffany ingested, inhaled, touched, accessed,
had contact with or even saw the pipe in her mother's room, the debris in the garage or
the other items found in Ms. Albretson5s bedroom, the preliminary hearing magistrate
bound Ms. Hall over for trial on the child endangerment count along with a misdemeanor
count of possession of paraphernalia. R. 70-71. The trial court refused to quash the
bindover of the child endangerment charge and denied Ms. Hall's motion to declare the
statute unconstitutional. See Order in Addendum A.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in refusing to quash the bindover of the child endangerment
count. The state failed to introduce sufficient evidence, without requiring speculation on

the part of the magistrate, that Ms. Hall knowingly or intentionally permitted thirteenyear-old Tiffany to be exposed to the items found in the house or detached garage so as to
violate the child endangerment statute.
There is no evidence in this case that Tiffany ingested, inhaled, accessed, saw or
was otherwise actually "exposed to" the items found in the two basement bedrooms or
detached garage. Because Tiffany was in the upstairs living room at the time the crime is
alleged to have occurred and her bedroom was likewise upstairs, the evidence presented
at the preliminary hearing failed to demonstrate probable cause to believe that she was
"exposed to" the items secreted in a closet and chest of drawers in downstairs bedrooms
occupied by adults or the debris in the garage or odor outside.
In addition, the evidence did not establish probable cause to believe Ms. Hall acted
knowingly or intentionally in permitting Tiffany to be "exposed to" items that were
hidden in a downstairs closet or secreted in a chest of drawers in a room occupied by
another person. Moreover, the state failed to establish probable cause to believe that the
items in the garage or the odor the officer characterized as that of a methamphetamine lab
constituted controlled substance, chemical substance or paraphernalia as those terms are
defined in the child endangerment statute. The trial court therefore erred in refusing to
quash the bindover on the child endangerment count.
The child endangerment statute is unconstitutional as applied in this case. The
facts in this case where among other things, Ms. Hall was bound over for endangering a
thirteen-year-old who was in an upstairs living room, away from either of the basement
bedrooms where items were located and the detached garage which contained only

"debris,"5 demonstrate not only that the statute fails to give notice as to what constitutes
exposure but also that judges, officers, and prosecutors are left to decide what constitutes
exposure and whether any risk of harm is required in order to sustain a child
endangerment charge.
There is no evidence that Tiffany had ever been in the downstairs bedrooms and
even if she had, the items were secreted in drawers and a closet. Nor is there evidence
that she faced the possibility of danger. Although the officer smelled what he
characterized as the odor of a methamphetamine lab while outside the house, the
evidence did not establish probable cause to believe that the odor or debris qualified as a
chemical substance, controlled substance or paraphernalia under the child endangerment
statute. While the magistrate bound the child endangerment charges over for trial in this
case, in similar circumstances before this Court, it has been held that the circumstances
do not warrant bindover. Because Ms. Hall could not have known that these
circumstances where Tiffany was not endangered would give rise to a child
endangerment charge and the statute does not contain adequate guidelines, the statute is
void for vagueness under the circumstances of this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. WHERE THE EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH PROBABLE
CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT APPELLANT KNOWINGLY OR
INTENTIONALLY PERMITTED THE JUVENILE TO BE "EXPOSED
TO" CONTRABAND, THE BINDOVER SHOULD BE QUASHED
The trial court erred in failing to dismiss the child endangerment count where the
evidence did not establish probable cause to believe that Ms. Hall knowingly or

intentionally allowed thirteen-year-old Tiffany to be "exposed to" a controlled substance,
chemical substance or paraphernalia. In this case where the items were secreted in
downstairs bedrooms occupied by adults or consisted only of "debris" or an odor, and
Tiffany was found alone in an upstairs living room away from these items, the trial court
erred in upholding the child endangerment count. The evidence did not establish that
Tiffany could see or access the items or that Ms. Hall acted knowingly or intentionally in
permitting her to be "exposed to" or endangered by the items. In addition, the evidence
did not establish probable cause to believe that the debris in the garage or the odor
qualified as contraband under the statute. When viewed in the light most favorable to the
state, the evidence failed to establish probable cause; the trial court therefore should have
quashed the bindover of the child endangerment count.
Utah's child endangerment statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 makes it a
felony to endanger a child as outlined in the statute. Section 76-5-112.5 states in part:
(2)

Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who
knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance,
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1), is
guilty of a felony of the third degree.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). *

1

Although Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 applies to children and elder adults, for the
purposes of this brief, Appellant refers to the statute as the child endangerment statute
and discusses the statute as it applies to children. Because the statute applies to both
children and elder adults, any decision regarding the application of the statute to children
would also apply to elder adults.

The child endangerment statute allows prosecution for knowingly or intentionally
permitting a child to be "exposed to" controlled or chemical substances or paraphernalia
without defining of clarifying the meaning of the term "exposed to." See State v.
Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5,^8, 128 P.3d 1223, This Court held in Nieberger, that
although the word "exposed" is not defined in the statute, it nevertheless is sufficiently
definite, along with the remaining language in the child endangerment statute, to uphold
the statute against a challenge that it is void for vagueness as applied in that case. Id. at
Tflfl 1-15. This Court reached that conclusion by employing the following definition for
the word "expose":
Black's Law Dictionary defines "expose" as "[t]o show publicly, to display" and
[t]o place in a position where the object spoken of is open to danger, or
where it is near or accessible to anything that may affect it detrimentally;
as, to "expose" a child, or to expose oneself or another to a contagious
disease or to danger or hazard of any kind.
Id at HI5 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 579 (6th ed 1990)). Although this Court
rejected Nieberger's argument that the statute required a showing of substantial risk of
harm, it nevertheless incorporated the above definition and seemed to require that a child
be able to see and access a controlled substance and that exposure open the child to
danger or create the possibility that the child be affected detrimentally. Id at ffl2 n.3,
14, 15,
This Court's decision in Nieberger, along with rules of statutory construction
support the notion that a child must be subjected to a risk of harm in order to be
endangered. Since the words "exposed to" are not defined and are ambiguous, the title of
the statute and legislative history can be considered in determining the reach of the

statute. See Intermountain Slurry Seal v. Labor Comm'n., 20 UTApp 164, f6,48 P.3d
252; Estate of Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 521-22 (Utah 1997).
The title of the statute, "Endangerment of child or elder adult," shows that the legislature
intended that a child be endangered or face a risk of harm for the statute to apply. Utah
Code Ann. §76-5-112.5.2
The remaining alternatives for endangering a child listed in the statute likewise
demonstrate that there must be at least the possibility of harm for there to be exposure
under the statute since such a possibility of harm is inherent in those other alternatives.
See generally State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 17, ^f 13, 133 P.3d 396 (ejusdem generis canon
of statutory construction "provides that when a statute contains a list of specific words
that relate to a certain type of item and those words are followed by a general word, the
general word should be 'construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those
objects enumerated by the preceding specific words"'); Eaquinta v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
2005 UT 78,1HI9-10, 125 P.3d 901 (statute must not be interpreted in isolation and

While this Court concluded in Nieberger that the legislative history showed that the
legislature did not intend to require a substantial risk of harm to the child, the title, which
was not removed when the legislature amended the statute, shows that legislature
intended that a child be endangered in some way for the statute to apply. Further, Ms.
Hall maintains that the amendment to the statute, which focused on lessening the burden
for the prosecution of bringing in expert testimony to establish the danger caused by
controlled substances does not show that the legislature intended to remove the
requirement that a child be endangered; instead, unlike State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314,
1315 (Utah 1983)(per curiam) where the legislature focused on deleting an element, the
legislature in this case continued to require endangerment or a risk of harm but wanted to
make it easier for prosecutors to prove that a child was endangered. See legislative
history, House Bill 125, House Debates (February 25, 2002), Senate Debates (March 5,
2002); Senate Bill 188, House Debates (February 29, 2000), Senate Debates (February
22, 2000) in Addendum D.

instead must be "'construed as a whole, with all of its provisions construed to be
harmonious with each other'")- Reading the other alternatives, ingesting, inhaling, or
having contact in conjunction with the "exposed to" language demonstrates the
legislature intended that exposure necessarily requires there be a risk of harm to the child
on the same level as the risk associated with the other alternatives for there to be
exposure under the statute. Hence, although this Court in Nieberger rejected the claim
that the statute requires a substantial risk of harm to a child, the definition of expose
adopted by the Court, rules of statutory construction, and legislative intent suggest that
some risk of harm is required for there to be exposure under the statute.
This Court upheld the bindover in Nieberger, concluding that the evidence
demonstrated the children could see and access the controlled substances. The facts
supporting bindover in Nieberger were set forth in the opinion as follows:
Police found controlled substances and drug paraphernalia in the living
room, kitchen, basement, and master bedroom of Nieberger's home.
Nieberger admitted that her husband had been selling marijuana for five
years, that she occasionally used marijuana herself, and that marijuana and
a pipe found in plain view in the living room belonged to her. Nieberger's
children, two and three years old, lived in the home, and there is nothing to
suggest they lacked the ordinary mobility, perception, or curiosity that
could be expected of a child that age. [FN3] Nor does the record suggest
that the children were in any way restricted from accessing the rooms
where the various items were found.
FN3. The State presented evidence from which it could be
inferred that Nieberger's children could see and access
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Whether any particular
minor or elder adult has the ability to see and access a
particular object is a factual matter that must be resolved on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the circumstances of
the alleged exposure and the victim's physical abilities.

Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, ^fl2. The environment of the home, including the fact that
marijuana and paraphernalia were in plain view and were found throughout the house,
apparently convinced this Court in Nieberger that the children "could see and access
marijuana and drug paraphernalia" and therefore were "exposed to" those items. Id
In contrast to Nieberger, this Court vacated a bindover for child endangerment in
State v. Draper, 2006 UT App 6, 128 P.3d 1220 where the evidence failed to demonstrate
that Draper exposed her nursing baby to marijuana which she had ingested. Id at ^|14.
In that case, officers conducted a search of Ms. Draper's home pursuant to a search
warrant, and found marijuana and paraphernalia in a basement room and marijuana in
Ms. Draper's bedroom. Id at ^[2. In addition, Ms. Draper told officers that her husband
had been selling marijuana for eighteen months. Id Eleven days after the search, a
DCFS worker made an unannounced visit to the home and observed Ms. Draper nursing
her six-month-old child. Id at Tf3. Upon being questioned, Ms. Draper acknowledged
that she had used marijuana on two occasions since the birth of her child. Id
Relying on two different theories, that the baby was endangered by the drugs in
the house or alternatively that the baby was endangered by nursing, the state filed one
count of child endangerment against Ms. Draper. Draper. 2006 UT App 6, U1P-5; see
also Appellant's opening brief in State v. Draper, Case No. 20040879-CA at 4 filed in
this Court. The magistrate in Draper refused to bind the case over based on the theory
that drugs found in the basement and in a drawer in Ms. Draper's bedroom exposed the
baby to a controlled substance, but did bind the case over on the state's nursing theory.
See Appellant's opening brief in Draper at 4.

On appeal, this Court held that the state's nursing theory also did not demonstrate
probable cause to believe Ms. Draper endangered her baby and dismissed the child
endangerment charge. Draper, 2006 UT App 6, ^[13-14. Draper demonstrates not only
that the state's nursing theory does not sustain a bindover for child endangerment but also
that facts which included finding marijuana and paraphernalia in the basement along with
marijuana in a drawer in the bedroom and an admission by the defendant that she had
used marijuana and that her husband sold marijuana, do not establish probable cause to
believe that the baby was "exposed to" the marijuana and drug paraphernalia. In other
words, while the appellate decision in Draper focused on the state's nursing theory, the
reported facts regarding the drugs and paraphernalia found in the house also show in that
case more than the existence of drugs in rooms where a child might be present was
required to support the charge.
Additionally, Draper like Nieberger seems to require the possibility of danger to
the child in order to bind a defendant over for trial on a child endangerment charge.
While this Court spoke of the child's ability to see and access controlled substances in
Nieberger, it focused on "[t]he presence of marijuana in Draper's breast milk at the time
she nursed [her baby]" in determining whether there was probable cause to believe
Draper exposed her child to a controlled substance. Draper, 2006 UT App 6, ^[13.
Without expert testimony that Draper's breast milk was likely to be contaminated by a
controlled substance, this Court was unwilling to conclude that there was probable cause
to believe that the child was "exposed to" controlled substance. IdL This Court's
conclusion that the state did not establish probable cause to believe that the child was

"exposed to5' controlled substance when he nursed further demonstrates this Court
requires that the child have access to the controlled substance and be exposed to danger
in order to sustain a charge for child endangerment.
As in Nieberger and Draper, the magistrate apparently bound the present case over
under the "exposed to" language. R. 70-71. Since there is no evidence in this case that
Tiffany ingested, inhaled or had contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance
or drug paraphernalia, the "exposed to5' language is the only language of the statute
which even arguably applies. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2). But the presence of
a thirteen year old in a house where paraphernalia or drugs are found in the private
bedrooms of two adults and debris and odor the officers associated with a meth lab are
found in a detached garage and outside are not sufficient to show that Ms. Hall
intentionally or knowingly permitted Tiffany to be "exposed to" controlled substances,
chemical substances or paraphernalia as defined in the child endangerment statute.
Regardless of whether the statute requires a risk of harm, the state failed to establish
probable cause to believe Tiffany was "exposed to" any of the items outlined in the
statute. The marshaled evidence supporting the bindover of the three child endangerment
charges is as follows:
1.

Detective Wester was employed by the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office
and had been assigned to the Neighborhood Narcotics Unit for less than
two years. R. 53, 181. During that time, he had "received training on
narcotics" and "on Clan Labs." R. 54.

2.

On December 8, 2003, officers had obtained a search warrant to search a
house located at 5386 Silverton Drive in Salt Lake County based on
information that "there was a possible meth lab" and "drug dealing at the
location." R. 54. Ms. Hall was "the primary target" of the investigation.
R. 55.

3.

When officers arrived at about 4:00 p.m., the occupants of the house were
in the process of moving and people were leaving the house. R. 54-55.
Officers detained seven people. R. 55.

4.

Ms. Hall's thirteen year old daughter, Tiffany, was in the upstairs living
room of the house when officers arrived. R. 56, 60. Tiffany's bedroom
was also upstairs. R, 64. Tiffany appeared to be mobile and was "just
hanging around in the living room" when officers arrived; she did not
appear to be helping with the move. R. 56, 63.

5.

Ms. Hall's bedroom was in the basement. R. 57. In that bedroom, the
officers found a glass pipe similar to the types of pipes used to ingest
methamphetamine. R. 57-8. The pipe was wrapped in tissue and located
on a shelf on the top of a closet. R. 58, 63. The shelf was above a hanging
rod which could hold a winter coat, but the officer thought the thirteenyear-old was tall enough to reach it. R. R. 58, 63. The pipe was never
tested even though the officer testified that it had burn marks and a white,
smoky residue inside. R. 57-8, 64, 67-8.

6.

In another downstairs bedroom belonging to Teresa Albretson, the officers
found methamphetamine, a package of pseudoephedrine, a scale, and
packaging materials. R. 58, 59, 65. Pseudoephedrine can be used in the
production of methamphetamine, but it is an allergy medication; officers
found only one package of pseudoephedrine. R. 60, 65. The items were
located in a transparent, three set of drawers in Ms. Albretson's room. R.
58. No evidence was presented that Tiffany had ever been in that room.3

7.

The occupants were in the process of moving out of the house when
officers arrived and all of the doors were opened. R. 55, 57. When asked
whether he noticed doors or locks, the officer responded that the doors were
open without answering whether there were locks on the doors. R. 57.

8.

The officers also located "debris" in the detached garage, including empty
bottles of "Heat," black electrical tape, stained rubber gloves, and an odor
that Officer Wester characterized as the odor of a methamphetamine lab.
R.59. "Heat" can be used "to break up either the pills to separate the
efederin [sic] also it can be used to breakup the glue that is used on the
striker plates and the matches to get it to break up the red phosphorous." R.
59. The officers did not find beakers, iodine or phosphorous and the rubber
gloves were never tested or taken into evidence. R. 65, 67. The officer's

3

The findings refer to Ms. Albretson as Ms. Hall's sister. R. 181, 182. Since evidence
that Ms. Albretson was Ms. Hall's sister was not presented at the preliminary hearing,
this aspect of the findings is clearly erroneous. See generally State v. Humphrey, 2006
UT App 221, TJ15, 138 P.3d 590 (appellate court disregards trial court's factual findings if
they are clearly erroneous.)

explanation for failing to test the gloves was that "byproducts of
Methamphetamine are potentially carcinogenic, they are definitely
hazardous waste and we cannot take them into evidence." R. 67. The
officer could smell the odor outside, but could not remember whether he
could smell the odor inside the house. R. 59. He also did not know how
many doors the garage had or whether those doors were locked. R. 60.
The Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that bindover is not appropriate in
the absence of credible evidence supporting every element of the charge and also when
the evidence presented creates no more than speculation that the crime might have been
committed. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, f21 (citing inter alia State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159,
1H[l4-l7,3P.3d725).
. . . magistrates may decline bindover if the prosecution fails to
present sufficiently credible evidence on at least one element of the
crime. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, U 15 , 20 P.3d 300. Moreover,
magistrates are free to decline bindover where the facts presented by
the prosecution provide no more than a basis for speculation - - as
opposed to providing a basis for a reasonable belief. See State v.
Hester, 2000 UT App 159, HI 14-17, 3 P.3d 725.
Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^21. Although the child witness in Virgin said that the defendant
"put his finger in her bottom," and that "it hurt when he did but he took it out quickly"
(Id. at TJ3) the Supreme Court upheld the magistrate's refusal to bind the case over for
trial. Id atffi[25,35-38. Focusing on whether it was "reasonable" to believe the child
had been sexually abused given all of the evidence, the Supreme Court concluded the
magistrate was within his discretion in determining the evidence did not support a
bindover. Id. Hence, while the child's testimony in Virgin covered all of the elements,

the Supreme Court nevertheless made it clear that bindover was not appropriate because
it was not reasonable to believe that the crime had occurred.
Moreover, in Hester, cited favorably in Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^[21, this Court made
it clear that bindover is not appropriate when the state's case is based on speculation.
Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ^f 14. In that case, the defendant told an undercover officer he
had cocaine, took a twenty dollar bill from the officer, then told the officer to wait. Id at
^f 13. Rather than waiting to see whether the defendant returned with cocaine or simply
left with the twenty dollars, officers immediately arrested the defendant. Because the
state's claim that Hester would return with cocaine was merely speculation, this Court
concluded that the evidence did not "support a reasonable inference that Hester actually
intended to arrange for the distribution of a controlled substance - as opposed to just
stealing [the officer's] money," Id at ^4. Because the evidence did not support a
reasonable belief that Hester committed the crime of distribution of controlled substance
rather than theft, this Court held that bindover on distribution was not appropriate.
Just as the evidence in Hester and Virgin failed to establish a reasonable belief that
the defendants in those cases committed the crimes with which they were charged, the
evidence in this case fails to establish a reasonable belief that Ms. Hall intentionally or
knowingly permitted Tiffany to be "exposed to" a chemical substance, controlled
substance or paraphernalia as defined by the child endangerment statute. After the state's
evidence was reviewed as a whole, the magistrate was required to speculate as to whether
Tiffany had been downstairs and if so, whether she had been in the bedrooms and seen or
accessed the items secreted in Ms. Albretson's chest of drawers or Ms. Hall's closet. The

magistrate was also left to speculate whether Ms. Hall recognized the odor outside her
home as the odor that emanates from a methamphetamine lab, whether Tiffany had ever
smelled that odor, whether the odor presented any danger and whether the odor or any of
the debris qualified as a chemical substance, controlled substance or paraphernalia under
the statute. In this case, where Tiffany was located in the living room, away from the
downstairs bedrooms and detached garage, the evidence did not establish that she was
exposed to the items found in those places.
First, the evidence failed to establish probable cause to believe that Tiffany was
exposed to any of the items found in the downstairs bedrooms or outside the house. The
time at which the state alleges this crime to have occurred appears to be the time at which
the search warrant was issued. R. 1-3. At that time, Tiffany was in the upstairs living
room where she could not see or access anything in the downstairs bedrooms, detached
garage, or outside the house. R. 56, 60. She therefore was not "exposed to" those items
as required by the statute and Nieberger. See Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5,^12; Utah Code
Ann. §76-5-112.5.
In addition, Tiffany was not "exposed to" the pipe found in Ms. Hall's downstairs
bedroom because the pipe was not located in a place where it could be seen or accessed
and did not present any danger. R. 57-8, 63, In fact, the pipe was wrapped in tissue and
placed on an upper shelf in the closet. R. 58, 63. While it appeared to the officer to be
similar to pipes he had seen used to smoke methamphetamine, he did not have it tested.
R. 57-8, 64, 67-7. Under these circumstances where the pipe was not in plain view nor
easily accessible and the state has not demonstrated that it contained residue, the fact that

Tiffany might have been tall enough to reach it does not establish that she was "exposed
to" drug paraphernalia as defined by the statute.
The evidence likewise failed to establish probable cause to believe that Tiffany
was "exposed to" the items found in the chest of drawers in Ms. Albretson's room or the
detached garage. Although the chest of drawers was transparent, the officer did not
testify that the methamphetamine or packet of pills was unwrapped and visible, nor was
there any evidence Tiffany had access to those items, which were located in a drawer in
the private living quarters of an adult. R. 58, 59. The garage had doors and the officer
had no idea whether they were locked or unlocked. R. 60. The testimony therefore failed
to establish that Tiffany could see and access the contraband items in the garage.
Second, even if the evidence had shown that Tiffany could see and access the
items, the state failed to establish probable cause to believe that Ms. Hall knowingly or
intentionally permitted that to occur. The pipe located in Ms. HalPs bedroom was the
only item Ms. Hall allegedly possessed. The pipe was wrapped in tissue and placed on an
upper shelf, indicating an intent to hide the item and make it inaccessible to others. R.
58, 63. Hence, the location of the pipe and the fact that it was wrapped in tissue
demonstrated not only that Tiffany could not see and access it, but also that Ms. Hall did
not knowingly or intentionally permit her to do so.
Nor do the circumstances demonstrate probable cause to believe Ms. Hall
knowingly or intentionally permitted Tiffany to be "exposed to" any of the items secreted
in the drawers in Ms. Albretson's bedroom or in the detached garage, or to the odor
outside. Case law demonstrates that when contraband is found on premises occupied by

more than one person, it cannot be presumed that the defendant "knew of or possessed"
the contraband. State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v.
Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985). Because Ms. Hall did not have exclusive or even
constructive possession of the items in Ms. Albretson's bedroom or the detached garage,
"it may not be inferred that [she] had knowledge of the presence of the [items] or had
control, so that no submissible case is made." State v. Kuhn, 115 S.W.3d 845, 852 (Mo.
App. 2003) (further citation omitted).
Because the evidence fails to demonstrate that Ms. Hall had "the ability and the
intent to exercise dominion and control" over the items found in Ms. Albretson's room, it
likewise fails to show that Ms. Hall knowingly or intentionally permitted Tiffany to be
exposed to those items. Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388; see also Kuhn, 115 S.W.3d at 852. The
items in Ms. Albretson's room were put away in drawers where they were not easily
accessible and there is no evidence that Ms. Hall knew the items were there, especially in
light of the fact that they were inside a chest of drawers in someone else's bedroom.
Since the evidence failed to establish "a sufficient nexus between the accused and the
[items] to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to
exercise dominion and control over the [items]" (Fox, 709 P.2d at 319), it failed to
establish that Ms. Hall had knowledge of those items or that she knowingly or
intentionally permitted Tiffany to be exposed to them.
The evidence also fails to demonstrate probable cause to believe that Ms. Hall
was aware of the debris in the garage or the odor or that she intentionally or knowingly
permitted Tiffany to be exposed to them. Nothing suggests that Ms. Hall was aware of

the debris in the detached garage or the odor outside or had knowledge that the debris in
the garage qualified as contraband under the child endangerment statute. Nor does the
evidence demonstrate that had she been aware of the odor, she would have known that it
was caused by a methamphetamine lab or that the odor emanated from the garage rather
than a neighbor's house or car. Because the garage had doors that may or may not have
been locked, the evidence did not demonstrate that Ms. Hall had entered the garage or
that she had permitted Tiffany to do so or to be endangered by the debris in the garage.
Third, the state failed to establish probable cause to believe that the debris in the
garage or the odor qualified as a chemical substance, controlled substance or
paraphernalia under the child endangerment statute. The child endangerment statute
defines a chemical substance as "a substance intended to be used as a precursor in the
manufacture of a controlled substance.55 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.1(a). Intent under
this section may be demonstrated by the substance's use, quantity, manner of storage or
proximity to other prescursors, or to manufacturing equipment." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5112.5 (2). The debris found in the detached garage, which consisted of empty bottles of
HEET, black electrical tape, stained rubber gloves and an odor that the officer
characterized as the odor of a methamphetamine lab, does not fit this definition since
none of the items located in the detached garage was "a substance intended to be used as
a precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or any other chemical intended
to be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5112.5(l)(a). In other words, none of the items was a chemical substance let alone a
chemical substance used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Since the state did

not test the gloves and the HEET bottles were empty, the state failed to establish probable
cause to believe these items contained a chemical or controlled substance.
Additionally, in the absence of expert testimony, the state failed to establish
probable cause to believe that the odor qualified as a chemical or controlled substance
under the statute. Like the question of whether marijuana passes through breast milk to a
nursing baby, the question of whether the odor associated with a methamphetamine lab
passes a controlled or chemical substance to a person inside a house is "of sufficient
scientific complexity to require expert testimony.55 Draper, 2006 UT App 6, 1J10. In the
absence of such expert testimony, the state failed to demonstrate that the odor outside and
in the garage exposed Tiffany to a controlled or chemical substance. See generally
Kuhn, 115 S.W. 3d at 852 (odor of methamphetamine lab and lab equipment did not
establish child endangerment).
Nor do any of the items or odor qualify as controlled substance or drug
paraphernalia as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2 (Supp. 2006) and 58-37a-3 (2002).
The child endangerment statute incorporates the definitions for controlled substance and
paraphernalia found in Title 58. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-112.5(l)(c) & (d). Controlled
substances are defined as "a drug or substance included in Schedules I, II, III, IV of
Section 58-37-4, and also includes a drug or substance included in Schedules I, II, III, IV,
or V of the federal Controlled Substances A c t . . .

." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(f)(i).

Drug paraphernalia is defined in Section 58-37a-3 as "any equipment, product, or
material used, or intended for use, to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, package,

repackage, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to otherwise produce a
controlled substance into the human body . . .

." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-3. Without

testing and expert testimony, the evidence failed to establish probable cause to believe
that the debris of odor fit within these definitions. See Draper, 2006 UT App 6, ^9.
Moreover, the "debris" could be found in any ordinary garage and fails to
demonstrate the existence of an active methamphetamine lab in the past or at the time
charged in the Information. HEET is ordinarily found in a garage since it is normally
used as "a gasoline antifreeze and water remover" used to make "cold engines start."
http://www.goldeagle.com/heet/index.htm. HEET "contains special additives and
methanol" and two bottles are used for a gas tank that holds twenty gallons of gas. Id.
Empty bottles of HEET in a Utah garage in December is therefore a common occurrence
independent of methamphetamine production. Stained gloves likewise could be found in
most garages, especially garages where persons are adding HEET to car engines, and do
not create probable cause even in the presence of the empty HEET containers to
demonstrate that an active methamphetamine lab had been in the garage.4 The black
electrical tape when considered in conjunction with the empty HEET bottles and stained
gloves does not raise the evidence to the probable cause level since black electrical tape
can be found in most households or garages. See Kuhn, 115 S.W.3d at 851 n.3 (presence
of common household item without more does not establish child endangerment charge).
4

Despite the officer's testimony that the gloves were not tested because it might be
dangerous to do so, hazardous materials associated with methamphetamine production
and methamphetamine itself are routinely tested, using appropriate procedures to ensure
the safety of the persons conducting the tests. See e ^ State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66,
122P.3d639. '

Nor does the purported odor of a methamphetamine lab demonstrate that the
evidence found in the garage or outside established probable cause to believe Tiffany was
exposed to a controlled or chemical substance or paraphernalia. In the absence of expert
testimony, it is impossible to determine whether an odor presents any risk of harm or can
be characterized as a chemical or controlled substance. Additionally, there are four
possible smells, some of which might appear similar to the smells found in ordinary
garages, which are associated with meth labs, http://
www.epi.state.nc.us/epi.oii/pdf/methlab.pdf.

Those four odors are: (1) an etherlike odor

commonly associated with hospitals, (2) a solvent like odor found in autobody shops, (3)
a vinegar like odor, and (4) an ammonia like odor that is sharp and irritating like glass
cleaner or wet diapers. Id. While this officer who had a little over one year experience in
drug detection at the time of the incident said that the odor smelled like a
methamphetamine lab, that testimony does not add to the probable cause determination
not only because of the lack of expert testimony as to whether odor qualifies as a
chemical substance or causes any potential harm, but also because of the lack of specific
description of the smell.5 Given the fact that the officer did not testify that there were
stains, toxic waste, leftover chemicals or equipment, or methamphetamine in the garage,
the odor, in the absence of more specific description and scientific evidence, fails to
demonstrate probable cause to believe that Tiffany was exposed to a controlled or

5

The officer testified at the preliminary hearing on October 28, 2004 that he had been in
narcotics detection for almost two years at that time. R. 52, 53. The incident in this case
occurred almost eleven months earlier on December 8, 2003. R. 53. The officer
therefore had been in his position for about a year at the time of this incident.

chemical substance. See generally Kuhn, 115 S.W.3d at 847-51 (no actual risk of harm
where child was present in mobile home that contained odor of chemicals associated with
methamphetamine production but no dangerous equipment and "no dangerous fume
producing elements used in the manufacture of methamphetamine were found.")
Fourth, as previously outlined, there is no evidence that Tiffany faced any risk of
harm. Tiffany was in the living room, away from any of the alleged contraband items, at
the time the crime is alleged to have been committed. R. 56, 60. The pipe in Ms. Hall's
bedroom was secreted in the closet and never tested for residue; the evidence therefore
fails to demonstrate that the pipe posed any danger to Tiffany. The evidence also failed
to demonstrate that the items in Ms. Allbretson's room or the garage, or the odor outside,
presented the possibility of harm to Tiffany. The items in Ms. Albretson's room were put
away in a chest of drawers in a room occupied by someone other than Ms. Hall. R. 58.
The bottles of HEET were empty and the gloves were never tested to establish whether
the stains were from a chemical or controlled substance or ordinary use in a garage or
garden. R. 65, 67. Moreover, the state failed to present any evidence that an odor
associated with a methamphetamine lab would create a risk of harm.
Under the circumstances in this case, regardless of whether a risk of harm is
required, the state did not present sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable belief,
absent speculation, that Ms. Hall intentionally or knowingly permitted Tiffany to be
"exposed to" a controlled substance, chemical substance or paraphernalia so as to violate
the child endangerment statute. The evidence did not establish that Tiffany could see or
access any items outlawed by the statute or that Ms. Hall intentionally or knowingly

allowed that to happen. In addition, the evidence did not demonstrate that the odor or
debris in the garage qualified as items outlawed by the child endangerment statute.
Moreover, the evidence did not demonstrate that Tiffany faced any risk of harm under the
circumstances encountered by the officers when they entered the home. Since the gaps in
the evidence cannot be filled by speculation, the bindover on the child endangerment
charge should have been quashed.
POINT II. THE CHILD ENDANGERMENT STATUTE IS VOID FOR
VAGUENESS SINCE IT FAILS TO GIVE NOTICE AND ALLOWS FOR
ARBITRARY ENFORCEMENT WHEN A JUVENILE HAS NOT SEEN OR
ACCESSED CONTRABAND BUT IS LOCATED IN A HOUSE WHERE
SUCH ITEMS ARE FOUND
The child endangerment statute is void for vagueness in violation of due process
since it fails to give notice that the circumstances of this case would subject a person to a
child endangerment charge, and allows prosecutors, police officers and judges unguided
discretion to decide the reach of the statute, thereby allowing arbitrary and discriminatory
application in a case such as this one. The words "exposed to" in the statute are not
sufficiently defined so as to clarify what constitutes exposure and this Court's decisions
fail to remedy the uncertainty of the statute, especially under the circumstances of this
case. The application of the "exposed to" language in this and other cases, including the
uncertainty as to the level of the risk of harm, if any, that is required, shows not only that
the statute fails to give notice that the circumstances of this case would give rise to a
child endangerment charge but also leaves it to judges, prosecutors, and police officers to
decide what constitutes exposure. Because the statute is unconstitutionally vague, the

statute should be invalidated or, at the very least, the "exposed to" language should be
stricken.
Principles of procedural due process prohibit the application of a statute that is
vague. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^ 43, 99 P.3d 820, 830-31. A penal statute is
unconstitutionally vague when it fails to "'define the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" Id. (quoting
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (further citation omitted)).
The notice aspect of the vagueness doctrine requires that a statute be invalidated
when the statute "fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to
understand what conduct it prohibits[.]" City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56
(1999). The purpose of this aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is to enable the ordinary
citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law." Id. at 58. A loitering statute that made
it a crime to "remain in any one place with no apparent purpose" "failfed] to give an
ordinary citizen adequate notice of what is forbidden and what is permitted" in Morales
and therefore violated this first aspect of the vagueness doctrine. IdL at 60-1. A child
endangerment statute that applied to a person "who [p]laces [a] dependent in a situation
that may endanger his life or health," thereby allowing prosecution in certain
circumstances where there was only a possibility of harm, also violated this first aspect of
the vagueness doctrine because it failed to give notice to persons of ordinary intelligence
of the conduct proscribed by the statute. State v. Downey, 476 N.E.2d 121, 123 (Ind.
1985).

Both aspects of the vagueness doctrine are important and bear on whether the
prohibitions of the statute are sufficiently defined so as to comply with due process. See
Greenwood v. City of N. Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357). While the notice aspect is important, the vagueness
requirement that the legislature establish minimal guidelines so as to protect against
arbitrary enforcement is of even greater importance, especially in the criminal context.
See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58; Commonwealth v. Carter, 462 S.E. 2d 582, 584 (Va.
Ct.App. 1995).
A loitering statute that does not contain guidelines for enforcement and instead
'provides absolute discretion to police officers to decide what activities constitute
loitering'" violates the second aspect of the vagueness doctrine. Morales, 527 U.S. at 61
(citations omitted). Likewise, a child endangerment statute that allows prosecution when
there may be a possibility of risk of physical harm to a child violates the second part of
the vagueness test since it allows officers to decide what conduct may create a possibility
of harm. Carter, 462 S.E.2d at 585. The child endangerment statute at issue in Carter
was vague because it failed to establish minimal guidelines for law enforcement, thereby
leaving it to law enforcement to decide what conduct might create a possibility of harm
so as to give rise to a child endangerment charge. Id.
Utah's child endangerment statute violates both aspects of the vagueness doctrine
under the circumstances of this case in that it fails to give notice to a person of ordinary
intelligence that the circumstances here would give rise to a child endangerment charge
and also because it fails to provide minimal guidelines for law enforcement, thereby

allowing for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5112.5. The statute allows prosecution for permitting a child to be "exposed to" controlled
or chemical substances or paraphernalia without defining the meaning of "exposed to."
See Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, ^[15. While a risk of harm is inherent in the other acts
outlined by the statute, inhaling or ingesting a controlled substance, chemical substance
or paraphernalia or having contact with these items, the statute is not clear as to the level
of potential harm, if any, which must exist for there to be exposure or whether the child
must actually be endangered in order to support a prosecution under the statute.
Moreover, by failing to require a substantial risk of harm, Utah's statute suffers from the
same flaws as the statutes at issue in Carter and Downey by failing to give notice or
guidelines as what conduct the statute proscribes.
This Court's decisions in Nieberger and Draper also do not sufficiently define the
term "exposed to" so as to guide law enforcement as to what is required in order to
expose a child to a controlled substance so as to give rise to a charge of child
endangerment Indeed, while this Court rejected the argument that a substantial risk of
danger is required, it seemed to nevertheless require that a child be able to see and access
the controlled substance and embraced a definition that necessarily includes a
requirement that the child be endangered. See Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, ^[11-15;
discussion in Point I supra at 10-15. Similarly, in Draper, this Court seemed to require
evidence that the child actually be endangered by nursing in order to sustain the charge.
See Draper, 2006 UT App 6, ^13. This lack of clarity as to what level of risk, if any, is
required under the statute fails to give notice that a thirteen-year-old located in the living

room of a home where officers find items secreted in downstairs bedrooms and debris in
a detached garage along with an odor associated with a methamphetamine lab would give
rise to a child endangerment charge.
This Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute against a vagueness challenge
as applied to the facts in Nieberger. Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, ^[14-18. Because this
Court concluded that a person of ordinary intelligence would know that controlled
substances and paraphernalia found throughout the house in areas that children could see
and access would give rise to prosecution under the statute, the statute did not offend the
first aspect of the vagueness test under the Nieberger facts. Id. at f 14-15. In addition,
this Court concluded that the statute did not allow for arbitrary enforcement under the
facts of Nieberger since "Nieberger's alleged acts of allowing her children to see and
potentially access controlled substances and paraphernalia fall squarely within the
statute's purview, ieaving no room for law enforcement officials to decide, in their
discretion, that the statute's provisions should not apply.'" Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5,
117.
By contrast, the courts in Carter and Downey held that the child endangerment
statutes in those cases were unconstitutionally vague because they allowed prosecution
for acts that only "may" endanger a child, thereby failing to give notice as to what acts
might endanger a child or allowing police officers, judges and prosecutors to decide
whether an act "may" create a possibility of harm to a child. For example, in Carter, the
Virginia statute which allowed prosecution for child endangerment when a person
"willfully or negligently [ ] cause [s] or permit[s] [a] child to be placed in a situation that

its life, health or morals may be endangered" was unconstitutionally vague as applied.
Carter, 462 N.E.2d at 585. The court reasoned that the language of the statute, including
the use of the word "may" allowed for arbitrary enforcement because it "criminalizes any
act which presents a 'possibility' of physical or moral harm to the child." Id. at 585
(emphasis in the original). Because the statute left it to police and prosecutors to decide
whether a given activity may create a possibility of harm, the statute was
unconstitutional:
Thus, guided by subjectivity and personal predilection, police and
prosecutors in this instance concluded that the factually diverse conduct of
each defendant possibly endangered the life, health, or morals of minors
then in their custody. This determination may have resulted from
individual moral imperatives, unique perspectives on the specific conduct,
or defendant's mere status. Whatever the motivation and however wellintentioned, the vague and inclusive statutory language clearly failed to
adequately inform law enforcement of the precise conduct prohibited by
[the statute], thereby accommodating arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.
Id. at 585 (footnote and citations omitted).
Like the statute in Carter, Utah's child endangerment statute allows police,
prosecutors, and judges to decide whether any possibility of harm is required and if so,
what level of possibility, as well as whether a juvenile is "exposed to" contraband items
when found in the same house where such items are located. As was the situation in
Carter, the determination that the circumstances in this case gave rise to a child
endangerment charge may have been based on the moral perspective of the officer or
judge, or a distaste for Ms. Hall's lifestyle rather than on guidelines articulated by the
legislature. Additionally, the definition of "expose" embraced by this Court in Nieberger,

2006 UT App 5, TI15, which includes situations that may affect a child detrimentally,
suffers from the same unconstitutional flaw as the statute in Carter. By not requiring a
substantial risk of harm to a child, Utah's statute suffers from the same flaw as the statute
in Carter as is evident in this case where there is no evidence that the thirteen-year-old
faced a risk of harm from the debris in the garage or the items secreted in the bedrooms,
let alone a substantial risk of harm.
The Indiana Supreme Court reached a result similar to that in Carter, holding that
Indiana's child endangerment was unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Downey, 476
N.E.2d at 123. The Indiana statute allowed a person to be prosecuted for child
endangerment when he or she "[p] laces the dependent in a situation that may endanger
his life or health." Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 123. The defendant argued that the statute
was "not specific enough to inform persons of ordinary intelligence of the proscribed
conduct because every situation carries with it some degree of danger." Id. Because the
statute allowed prosecution for action that "may endanger" a child and did not require
that the conduct give rise to "a danger which is actual and appreciable," the court
concluded that the statute left persons of ordinary intelligence "to guess about the
statute's meaning and [ ] differ as to its application." Id Similarly, Utah's statute which
allows prosecution for permitting a child to be "exposed to" a controlled substance or
paraphernalia, including situations that may affect a child detrimentally (Nieberger, 2006
UT App 5, f 15), leaves a person of ordinary intelligence to guess as to the statute's
meaning and to apply the statute disparately, especially in a case such as this one where
there is no evidence that the teenager was able to see or access any of the items

delineated in Utah's child endangerment statute or otherwise faced any possibility of
danger, let alone a substantial risk of danger.
Like the courts in Carter and Downey, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that its
child endangerment statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied in State v. Scruggs,
905 A.2d 241, 279 Conn. 698, 725 (Conn. 2006). In Scruggs, the state charged the
defendant with child endangerment based on the extremely cluttered and messy condition
of defendant's home, alleging that this condition endangered the mental health of
Scruggs' twelve-year-old son who committed suicide. I d at 700-02. The defendant
challenged the constitutionality of the statute as applied to her, claiming that the statute
"did not provide her with adequate notice of the line dividing lawful conduct from
unlawful conduct in this context." LI at 713. The court concluded that the statute was
vague, in violation of due process, since it did not give notice "that the conditions in the
apartment posed an unlawful risk to the mental health of a child" in violation of the
statute. Id. at 719. Because the statute was unconstitutionally applied to Scruggs, the
court vacated the conviction. IcL at 725.
Utah's child endangerment statute is constitutionally flawed like the Virginia,
Indiana and Connecticut statutes in that it allows prosecution for child endangerment
without indicating what level of risk of harm, if any, is required. Because Utah's child
endangerment statute allows prosecution for permitting a child to be "exposed to" a
controlled substance, chemical substance or paraphernalia without clarifying whether any
possibility of harm is required, law enforcement, prosecutors and judges are left to decide
whether any risk of harm is required and to decide what constitutes exposure to a

controlled substance, chemical substance or paraphernalia. This is especially true in a
case such as this where there is no evidence that the child actually saw or accessed the
controlled substance, chemical substance or paraphernalia or was otherwise endangered
by the items or faced any possibility of harm from them. Additionally, because Utah's
statute allows prosecution when a child is open to danger or "near or accessible to
anything that may affect it detrimentally," (Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, <f 15), Utah's
statute suffers from constitutional deficiencies very similar to those in the Virginia,
Indiana and Connecticut statutes in that the level of danger, if any, required for violation
of the statute is not clear.
The application of the statute in this case further demonstrates the vagueness of
Utah's child endangerment statute as applied. The Information shows that the crime of
child endangerment allegedly occurred on December 8, 2003, the date on which the
search warrant was executed. R. 1-3. At that time, Tiffany was alone in the upstairs
living room. The pipe, the only item allegedly possessed by Ms, Hall, was in Ms. Hall's
downstairs bedroom, wrapped in tissue and placed on the upper shelf of the closet where
it was not in plain view. Although the officer thought Tiffany might have been tall
enough to reach the pipe, there was no evidence Tiffany had been in the room or seen or
accessed the pipe. Moreover, the pipe was never tested so the risk, if any, that might
have existed had Tiffany entered the room, searched the closet and located the pipe was
not established.,
Additionally, the facts in Draper, when compared to the facts of this case,
demonstrate the standardless sweep of this statute and its potential for arbitrary and

discriminatory enforcement. Although marijuana and paraphernalia were found in a
basement room in that case, the state was not able to sustain a bindover on the charge that
Ms. Draper endangered her child. Draper, 2006 UT App 6, ^[2. In addition, this Court
held that the evidence did not sustain a bindover on the state's theory that Ms. Draper had
exposed her child to controlled substance through nursing because the state had not
presented evidence that the controlled substance would pass to the child through nursing.
Id. at fl 1. By contrast, the trial court in this case upheld a bindover when there is no
evidence that any of the debris or odor qualify as a controlled substance, chemical
substance or paraphernalia or would affect Tiffany in any way, nor any evidence that she
could see or access the items in the bedrooms.
The inconsistent and standardless application of the statute within the context of
this case as well as when compared with the facts of Draper and Niebereger demonstrates
the vagueness of the child endangerment statute and requires that the statute be
invalidated or, at the very least, that the "exposed to" language be stricken. When a
statute is unconstitutionally vague and is "'not reasonably susceptible to a limiting
instruction,'" the statute must be invalidated. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 51 (citation
omitted). In interpreting a statute to meet constitutional requirements, this Court must
further the legislative intent and, in so doing, cannot rewrite the statute. In re I.M.L.,
2002 UT 110, ^25, 61 P.3d 1038. On the other hand, if the statute can be given a
narrowing construction or if severing a portion of the statute would do away with
constitutional infirmities, a court can either strike portions of the language or construe the
statute so that it fits within constitutional requirements. See Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 122-

3 (construing statute narrowly to meet constitutional requirements); Carter, 462 S.E.2d at
585 (striking portion of child endangerment statute that was unconstitutionally vague).
In order to comply with due process and excise the vagueness of this statute, this
Court should at the very least strike the "exposed to" language. Moreover, because the
statute is unclear as to whether risk of harm is required and if so, what level, the statute as
a whole should be invalidated.
CONCLUSION
Appellant/Defendant Kathy Hall, by and through counsel, Joan Watt and Shannon
Romero, respectfully requests that this Court hold that Utah's child endangerment statute
violates due process as applied in this case or, in the alternative, that the state failed to
establish probable cause to support the child endangerment charge.
SUBMITTED this _3_ day of November, 2006.

\ JftLA. I. (AL?Y
JOAN C.WATT
SHANON ROMERO
Attorneys for Appellant/Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Joan C. Watt, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the original
and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah
Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O.
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah, this ^__ day of November, 2006.

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's
Office as indicated above this

day of November, 2006.

ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

State of Utah,

:

vs.
Kathy Hall,

:

Minute Entry

:

Case No. 041100373

The matter before the Court is defendant's Motion to Quash
Bindover/Declare

Utah

Code

Annotated

Section

76-5-112.5

Unconstitutional. The preliminary hearing in this case was held on
October 28, 2004. Since the preliminary hearing the Utah Court of
Appeals has addressed the constitutionality of Section 76-5-112.5
in State vs. Nieberger.
Because the Utah Court of Appeals has found the statute to be
constitutional, that portion of Defendant's Motion is denied.
The Court will address the remaining portion of the Motion that
seeks

to

quash

the

Bindover, because

there

"is

insufficient

evidence to demonstrate probable cause that Ms. Hall violated the
child

endangerment

statute."

This

Court

did

not

hear

the

preliminary hearing, but has reviewed the transcript provided by

the Defendant and the memoranda of the parties, A review of the
transcript reveals the testimony of Detective Wester, the State's
sole witness to be as follows:
1. Detective Wester was employed by the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Department, assigned to the Neighborhood Narcotics Unit. (Tr. 1)
2. Detective Wester had received training regarding clandestine
laboratories. (Tr. 2)
3. That a search warrant had been obtained to search 5386 West
Silverton Drive, in Salt Lake County, because the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Department had received information that there was a
possible meth lab and drug dealing at that address (Tr. 2)
4. Defendant, Kathy Hall, was one of the people, who was identified
in the search warrant and/or the affidavit in support of search
warrant and was a primary target of the investigation. (Tr. 3)
5. Defendant lived in the home and occupied a downstairs bedroom.
Defendant's 13-year old daughter lived in the home and occupied an
upstairs bedroom. Defendant's sister also lived in the home and
occupied a downstairs bedroom,
6. The* 13-year old daughter was mobile and apparently had access to
all portions of the house, including the rooms where the items were
found. (Tr. 4 and 5)
7. In defendant's bedroom,
wrapped

the officers located a glass pipe,

in tissue paper, on

a closet

shelf. Detective

Wester

testified that it was the type "used to ingest methamphetamine, "
and it had been used, had burn marks on it, and a white smokey

residue inside. (Tr. 5, 15, and 16)
8. Detective Wester testified that the 13-year old was tall enough
that she could reach the glass pipe on the closet shelf. (Tr. 6)
9. The officers found me thamphet amine, scales, packaging material,
and pseufederin pills in the sister's downstairs bedroom. (Tr. 6
and 7) [Pseufederin is apparently a type of legal cold medicine
that can be used

in the manufacture

of methamphetamine. ] The

me thamphetamine; scales, and packaging material were found inside
transparent shelves in the defendant's sister's bedroom. (Tr. 6)
10. Inside a detached garage, Detective Wester testified that they
found

"debris

from

the methamphetamine

laboratory."

Detective

Wester when asked what items were found in the garage testified:
"There were bottles of Heat, empty bottles of Heat, there was black
tape that is used to connect pipes, there were

stained rubber

gloves and there was an overwhelming odor of a Methamphetamine
Lab." (Tr. 7) . Detective Wester testified that Heat is used in the
process to manufacture Methamphetamine. Heat is used to separate
the efederin
downstairs

from pseufederin pills, like

bedroom

occupied

by

those

defendant's

found

sister,

in the
Theresa

Albretsen. (Tr. 7)
The

magistrate

must

view

the

evidence

presented

at

the

preliminary hearing in the light most favorable to the State and
must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. At the
preliminary hearing, the State must show probable cause to believe
that the crime of Child Endangerment was committed and probable

cause to believe that the Defendant was the person who committed
that crime. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the State and in drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
State, the Court believes that the State has met those burdens. The
Court concludes that there is probable cause to believe that the
crime

of

Child

Endangerment

was

committed

and

that

there

is

probable cause to believe that the Defendant committed that crime.
Defendant's

Motion

to

Quash

Bindover/Declare

Unconstitutional is denied.
Counsel for Plaintiff to prepare the Order.

Dated this /f)

day of April, 2 006.

Statute

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the 18th day of April, 2006,1 delivered a true and correct copy of the forgoing
MINUTE ENTRY, to the following:

Josh Player
Attorney for the State
drop box at Court
Shannon Romero
Attorney for Defendant
drop box at Court

Court Clerk

A :. <

h

^

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
R. JOSH PLAYER, Bar No. 7768
Deputy District Attorney
8080 South Redwood Road, Suite 1100
West Jordan, UT
Telephone: (801) 233-9900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 041100373FS

KATHY HALL,

Honorable Robert Adkins

Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover and Declare U.C.A. § 76-5-112.5
Unconstitutional and Memorandum in Support thereof had a preliminary hearing on
October 28, 2004, in which Defendant was represented by counsel, Shannon Romero.
The State filed its Response to the same, in which the State was represented by counsel,
R. Josh Player. The Court having reviewed the attorney's legal briefs, the preliminary
transcripts, and reviewed the relevant case law now enters its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Detective Wester was employed by the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department,
assigned to the Neighborhood Narcotics Unit. Detective Wester has received
training regarding clandestine laboratories

2.

A search warrant had been obtained to search 5386 West Silverton Drive, in Salt
Lake County, because the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department had received
information that there was a possible meth lab and drug dealing at that address.

3.

Defendant, Kathy Hall, was one of the people who was identified in the search
warrant and/or the affidavit in support of the search warrant and was a primary
target of the investigation.

4.

Defendant lived in the home and occupied a downstairs bedroom. Defendant's
13-year-old daughter lived in the home and occupied an upstairs bedroom.
Defendant's sister, Theresa Albretsen, also lived in the home and occupied a
downstairs bedroom.

5.

The 13-year-old daughter was mobile and apparently had access to all portions of
the house, including rooms where the items were found.

6.

In Defendant's bedroom, the officers located a glass pipe wrapped in tissue paper
on a closet shelf. Detective Wester testified that it was the type "used to ingest
methamphetamine," and it had been used, as evidenced by the burn marks on it
as well as a white smoky residue on the inside.

7.

Detective Wester testified that Defendant's 13-year-old daughter was tall enough
to reach the glass pipe on the closet shelf

8.

The officers found methamphetamine, scales, packaging material, and a single
package of pseudoephederine pills in Albretsen's downstairs bedroom.
Pseudoephederine is a type of legal cold medicine that can be used in the
manufacture of methamphetamine.

The methamphetamine, scales, and

packaging material were found inside transparent storage drawers in Albretsen's
bedroom.
9.

Inside a detached garage, Detective Wester testified that they found "debris from
the methamphetamine laboratory." When asked what items he found in the
garage, Detective Wester testified, "There were bottles of Heet, empty bottles of
Heet, there was black tape that is used to connect pipes, there were stained rubber
gloves and there was an overwhelming odor of a methamphetamine lab."
Detective Wester testified that Heet is used in the process to manufacture
methamphetamine.

Heet

is used

to

separate

the

Ephederine

from

pseudoephederine pills, like those found in the downstairs bedroom occupied by
Defendant's sister, Theresa Albretsen.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Utah Court of Appeals has found the statute, U.C.A. § 76-5-112.5, to be
constitutional.

Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to find the child

endangerment statute unconstitutional is denied.
2. The magistrate must view the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing in the
light most favorable to the State and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the State. At the preliminary hearing, the State must show probable cause to

believe that the crime of Child Endangerment was committed and probable cause
that the defendant was the person who committed that crime.
3. la viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the State, and in drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the State, the Court concludes that the State has
met those burdens.
4. There is probable cause to believe that the crime of Child Endangemient was
committed and there is probable cause to believe that Defendant committed that
crime.
5. Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover and Declare U.C.A. § 76-5-112.5
unconstitutional is denied.

ADDENDUM B

FILED
UTAH APPFI.LATE GOI ^

JUN 0 7 2006

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-ooOoo-

Kathy H a l l ,
ORDER
Petitioner,
Case No. 20060407-CA
v.

S t a t e of U t a h ,
Respondent,

Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Thorne.
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to
appeal is granted.
DATED this

7

day of June, 2006,

FOR THE COURT:

William A. Thorne Jr., Judg

ADDENDUM C

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

76-5-112.5. E n d a n g e r m e n t of child or elder adult.
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) "Chemical substance" means a substance intended to be used as a
precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or any other
chemical intended to be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance.
Intent under this subsection maybe demonstrated by the substance's use,
quantity, manner of storage, or proximity to other precursors, or to
manufacturing equipment.
(b) "Child" means the same as that term is defined in Subsection.
76-5-109(l)(a).
(c) "Controlled substance" means the same as t h a t term is defined in
Section 58-37-2.
(d) "Drug paraphernalia" means the same as t h a t t e r m is defined in
Section 58-37a-3.
(e) "Elder adult" means the same as that term is defined in Section
76-5-111.
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who
knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance,
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1), is
guilty of a felony of t h e third degree.
(3) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who
violates Subsection (2), and a child or elder adult actually suffers bodily injury,
substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to, ingestion of,
inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or
drug paraphernalia, is guilty of a felony of the second degree unless the
exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in the d e a t h of the child or
elder adult, in which case the person is guilty of a felony of the first degree.
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this section t h a t the
controlled substance was provided by lawful prescription for the child or
elder adult, and t h a t it was administered to the child or elder adult in
accordance with t h e prescription instructions provided with the controlled
substance.
(b) As used in this Subsection (4), "prescription" has t h e same definition
as in Section 58-37-2.

ADDENDUM D

1

MALE:

2

(inaudible) dangerous.

3

FEMALE:

Number 159 the 28 (inaudible) donated one day absence you'll

Senate bill 188 potential for children and elderly Pete Swazzle (?)

4

this was hurting law enforcement of criminal justice with a vote of eight yes, zero no,

5

three absent.

6

MR. SPEAKER:

7

MALE3:

8

MR. SPEAKER:

9

(Inaudible) you are again.

I would move to circle that place.
Motion to circle Senate Bill one, excuse me, (inaudible) Cox

are you prepared to address this bill?

10

COX: I would withdraw my motion.

11

MR. SPEAKER:

(Inaudible) to withdraw the motion representative. Okay the

12

bill has been read in and we'll go to representative Cox for presentation of Senate Bill

13

188.

14

COX: Thank you Mr. Speaker Potan. I appreciate the opportunity to present this

15

bill to you. What this basically does is changes the penalties re, related to operating a

16

Clandestine uh, drug lab that presents significant risks of injury or even potential death to

17

children, or to the elderly who might uh, be forced actually to live in those conditions.

18

Uh, if this bill is passed it would be a third degree felony to recklessly or knowingly or

19

intentionally cause or permit a child or an elderly person to suffer bodily injury from

20

exposure to a controlled substance, a chemical substance or to drug paraphernalia. The

1

1

second degree felony if there were actually harm caused by the exposure to the illegal

2

substances. Excuse me. It would be a first degree felony if that child or elderly person

3

died because of the exposure. It's fairly simple in nature. It's uh, supported by the, the

4

prosecutor's association, attorney general's office and uh, youth and family specialists

5

that uh, work in this arena. I'm open for questions.

6

MR. SPEAKER:

7

BUSH:

8

MR. SPEAKER:

9

MALE:

Discussion to the bill, representative Bush.

May I question the sponsor?
Sponsor yield?

Yes.

10

MR. SPEAKER:

11

BUSH:

What's the, what's the definition of elderly?

12

MALE:

The same, the same definition that is already in statute

13

representative.

14

BUSH:

What is it?

15

MALE:

I don't know. Nobody wants to say either.

16

BUSH:

Just don't, just don't do anything harmful to me.

17

MALE:

It's line, it's line 52 in the uh, in the bill. Elder adult means the same

18

Yes you may proceed.

as that term defined in Section 76-5-111. I don't have that opened right now.

19

MR. SPEAKER:

To the bill, representative Dillary?

20

DILLARY: Uh yes my question is there's no fiscal note on the bill and under

2
000

1

normal circumstances when we increase uh, penalties or enhance uh, bring on a new

2

felony or something this would involve incarceration and there would be a, a financial

3

impact.

4

MALE:

We (inaudible)

5

MR. SPEAKER:

6

DILLARY: Yes,

7

MR. SPEAKER:

8

DILLARY: I want him to address why there isn't one.

9

MR. SPEAKER:

Did you want him to yield the question?

Okay.

(Inaudible) Cox will you yield?

10

COX: Yes.

11

MR. SPEAKER:

12

COX: Thank you. Fiscal analysts indicated this could be done with in current

13

Yes, go ahead.

budgets.

14

DILLARY: That's a first.

15

MR. SPEAKER:

16

WRIGHT:

Thank you would sponsor yield?

17

MALE:

I'll try.

18

WRIGHT:

Representative Cox

19

MR. SPEAKER:

20

WRIGHT:

Thank you representative Wright to the bill.

(inaudible) you may proceed.

You say we enhance the penalties, what, what were they previously

3

1

and what are the enhancing to?

2

COX: ...Anywhere from uh, misdemeanors to third degree felonies.

3

WRIGHT:

4

Previously to now so this, this makes all these third degree felonies

and what, what's the difference I guess.

5

COX: No. The difference now is that if the bi, if the individual creates that urn,

6

that condition, that and they do that recklessly, knowingly or intentionally, uh cause or

7

permit a child or an elderly person to suffer bodily injury from exposure to those

8

substances, be a second degree felony if there was actual harm caused. If death resulted

9

as, as a result of that condition then it's a first degree felony.

10

WRIGHT:

So what would be the penalty for just having a drug lab now?

11

COX: It's just a misdemeanor for just having a uh, lab.

12

WRIGHT:

So it still would be a misdemeanor except we just, uh, and I su, I

13

support you know what we're trying to do but I'm wondering why, why don't we just

14

raise the penalties for having the drug lab in the first place. What, what you did was

15

actually if you had bodily harm, so you have to prove some type of bodily harm and then

16

it enhances the penalty rather then

17
18
19
20

COX: If, if there's, if there's actual cause of injury or death it enhances the
penalty, yes.
WRIGHT:

The question I would have is this a good way, why don't we just

raise the penalty for a drug lab? You know maybe I'm a little naive for having it in the

4

1

first place, whether we

2

MALE:

I, I think that's another bill that uh, representative uh, Tyler has

3

worked on quite a bit.

4

WRIGHT:

5

MR. SPEAKER:

6

DAYTON:

7

MR. SPEAKER:

8

MALE:

9

MR. SPEAKER

10

DAYTON:

Okay. Thank you.
Thank you for the discussions representative Dayton.

Thank you Mr. Speaker, will sponsor yield?
Will the sponsor yield?

Absolutely.
Yes you may proceed.

I, I'd like to pursue the questions that representative Wright had only

11

because um, somewhere between child and elderly, um there are a lot of people that don't

12

know about meth labs or even the danger that's involved in them and I'm uh, presuming

13

the way the bill is written is if a child or an elderly person wouldn't be able to remove

14

themselves from a situation, but, but a lot of people wouldn't, wouldn't know to. Until it

15

was too late, um, I'm, I'm just confused about that, would you ad, address that concern?

16

MALE:

These are, these are the people that are vulnerable that generally

17

don't have the choice, they're, they either don't have a choice because they're too young

18

or they're frightened, not able to leave, uh, their own children will be ere, creating the

19

hazard in their home and they're concerned about being able to have anywhere else to go,

20

um, because they have nowhere else to go.

5

1

DAYTON:

2

MR. SPEAKER:

3

CURTIS:

4

Thank you.

Thank you Mr. Speaker, I would like to reserve the right to make a

motion.

5

MR. SPEAKER:

6

CURTIS:

7

MR. SPEAKER:

8

COX: Reluctantly.

9

MR. SPEAKER:

10

For the discussion of the bill representative CURTIS.

CURTIS:

You made (inaudible) and reserve that right.

Thank you Mr. Speaker and will the sponsor yield to a question?
Do you yield representative Cox?

You may proceed.

Um, it appears that in the a committee that, well it appears that the

11

original intent of the bill was to go after intentional cont, con, conduct, um and the

12

committee knowing or intentional conduct, the committee edited the criminal copeability

13

standard of reckless, recklessly exposing somebody. Could you help me understand,

14

what, why uh, they were going in that direction?

15

MALE:

I think that's consistent with other, with language in other crimes.

16

That they recklessly, knowingly or intentionally, that, that's consistent with the criminal

17

code you're quite aware of that.

18
19
20

CURTIS:

Well it's not consistent, representatives, if Mr. Speaker if I could

place my motion to amend.
MR. SPEAKER:

You may proceed.

6

1
2
3
4

CURTIS:

On the golden rod copy line 53,1 would simply move to delete

recklessly, and if I may speak to that.
MR. SPEAKER:

You may, uh, let me repeat that, on, on the golden rod copy

line 53 we delete the word recklessly.

5

CURTIS:

Yes.

6

MR. SPEAKER:

7

CURTIS:

Okay you may proceed with explanation.

Thank you uh, Mr. Speaker. Representatives in the criminal code

8

there's a, there's a chapter entitled Chapter 2 which is principles of criminal

9

responsibility and then copeability is defined and you have a generally four standards of

10

criminal copeability. You have an intentional, a knowingly, a reckless or with criminal

11

negligence. And what we've done here in this bill is we've elevated the penalties, and

12

we've taken three of the four criminal standards of copeability. I think if somebody

13

intentionally or knowingly exposes somebody to these chemicals that they should have

14

some elevated principles, elevated copeability, but a reckless exposure to then say we're

15

going to elevate it, not every crime is as a reckless crime. When representative Cox says

16

well, I, I am familiar with the criminal code and that's why you have different levels of,

17

you have homicide, and you have manslaughter, and you have negligent homicide and

18

you have different levels based upon the copeability, but we've lumped all the

19

copeability together and elevated the penalties. I'm asking to take that one level of

20

copeability off and a reckless standard saying we did an intentional and knowingly and

7

1

uncomfortable with elevating the standard. But I'm not comfortable in elevating the

2

penalty if we're going to lower the standards to.

3

MR. SPEAKER:

4

COX: Thank you Mr. Speaker Protam. I'd resist the motion, uh, this was

5

recommended by the prosecutors. You got to recognize that when these individuals that

6

have created this situation, this dangerous, dangerous situation, oft times they are under

7

the influence of the drug themselves and what they do they do recklessly. We need to

8

hold them copeable. We need to hold them accountable for that. And it should be at a

9

higher level because of the danger that they're placing these small children and these

10
11
12
13

Representative Cox response to motion to amend?

elderly adults in. It's worthy of an elevated penalty. And I'd resist the motion on that.
MR. SPEAKER:

Further discussion to the motion to amend. Seeing none,

representative Curtis for summation on your motion.
CURTIS:

Thank you Mr. Speaker. I agree with representative Cox, it's worthy

14

of an elevated penalty. It's not worthy of a lower standard of copeability. There's a

15

distinction and there's a difference and when you as, and when you go in to do establish

16

how somebody did something if you're driving negligently and you kill somebody that's

17

different then if you intentionally kill somebody. What we're doing is we're lumping all

18

the standards of copeability together to get an elevated penalty. And I (tape went out).

19

Thank you.

20

MR. SPEAKER:

We'll place the motion to amend. The amendment is on the

8

1

golden rod copy line 53 we delete the word recklessly. All in favor of the motion to

2

amend say I.

3

GROUP:

I

4

MR. SPEAKER:

5

GROUP:

6

MR. SPEAKER:

Opposed no.

No.
Sheriff rules, the motion carries. Five or more standing?

7

Five or more standing be in division. Voting is open.... Having voted we'll close the

8

vote. Voting will be closed. Motion to Amend having received 39 yes notes and 24 no

9

votes passes. Good ears as usual. Further discussion to the bill. Seeing none,

10

representative Cox for summation on the bill.

L1

COX: Thank you Mr. Speaker Potan. Law enforcement has been working very

12

hard to clean up the meth labs in our communities. This provides them with the

13

opportunity, a better tool to do that, to be better enforcers of the laws that we as a body

14

have enacted. Uh, I'd appreciate your positive vote on this bill.

15

MR. SPEAKER:

Thank you, voting is open on Senate Bill 188.... Seeing all

16

present having voted we'll close the vote. Senate Bill 188 having received 67 yes votes

17

and 0 no votes will be returned to the senate for further action. Representative Norris

18

Stevens.

19
20

FEMALE:

It

^__-^

f

House Bill 125 endangerment of child or elder person with

controlled substance or precursor Trisha Beck. This was heard in judiciary with a vote of

9

1

9 yes and 0 no 4 absent.

2

MR. SPEAKER:

3

BECK:

Representative Beck.

Thank you Mr. Speaker. Urn, actually there were two oversights

4

either section dealing with endangerment of a child or an elder adult and this bill merely

5

corrects those oversights from the problems. The first problem is that the section

6

contains an all court proof requirement. It's obviously intended to cover the situation

7

where a person knowingly and intentionally gives a child or elder adult a controlled

8

substance and there by exposes him of or her to injury. This section should have simply

9

made it illegal to expose them to a non-prescribed controlled substance. Obviously they

10

have already determined that the controlled substances are risky to an individual's health,

11

otherwise they would not be a controlled substance. The same is true with the drug

12

paraphernalia and chemicals used to making illegal drugs. The current language

13

unintentionally requires the prosecutor to present scientific evidence to show that the

14

controlled substances are dangerous. That's not only expensive but it's also ridiculous to

15

spend all their time trying to show that. The other oversight in this section is that it

16

contains no exceptions for drugs which are administered in accordance with the

17

prescription from a (inaudible) physician. This bill also fixes that problem as it says in

18

the last two paragraphs. So this also urn, passed through the committee, um on it as a

19

consensus bill, as on, it passed through the committee unanimously. So with that, that

20

I'm open for any questions.

10

1

MR. SPEAKER:

Discussion to House Bill 125. See no lights. Uh, voting is

2

open on House Bill 125.... Sorry about that. Representative Beck waives summation.

3

It's obviously getting late.... Seeing all present, representative Murray, representative

4

Addaire, Senurey, Senior, Senate Bowman, I think the time's getting near, representative

5

Hanson, seeing all present and having voted Senate Bowman. Voting will be closed.

6

House Bill 125 having received 71 yes votes 0 no votes passes this body and referred to

7

the Senate for further consideration. Madam Reading Clerk.

8

MALE:

Senate Bill 188

9

FEMALE:

Senate Bill 188 protection for children and elderly, Senator Swazzle.

10

MALE:

Senator Swazzle.

11

SWAZZLE: And thank you Ms. President, uh this bill uh, as we discussed

12

yesterday addresses a very serious issue and that is the production of methamphetamines.

13

This bill would uh, put in place a series of penalties for those clandestine drug operators

14

as they manufacture these uh, illegal drugs and would put in place a penalty of a third

15

degree if they knowingly or intentionally cause or permit a child or elder to suffer bodily

16

injury. Second degree felony if they actually are harmed and a first degree felony if that

17

child or elder actually dies as a result of those illegal substances.

18
19
20

MALE:

'

Questions for Senator Swazzle. (Inaudible) questions being called.

Senate Bill 188 pass roll call.
FEMALE:

^

(inaudible) Ellett

11

1

ELLETT:

I

2

FEMALE:

Blackham,

3

BLACKHAM

4

FEMALE:

5

DEMETRIS:

6

FEMALE:

7

BART EVANS:

8

FEMALE:

9

VEL: I

I

Davis... Demetris
I
Bev Evans... Bart Evans
I

Vel

10

FEMALE:

Callowell

11

CALLOWELL:

12

FEMALE:

13

VILLIARD: I

14

FEMALE:

15

AL: I

16

FEMALE:

Holt

17

HOLT:

I

18

FEMALE:

Jones

19

JONES:

I

20

FEMALE:

Julander... Knutsen

I

Villiard

Al

KNUTSEN: I
2

FEMALE:

Densel... Maine

3

MAINE:

I

4

FEMALE:

Montgomery

5

MONTGOMERY: I

6

FEMALE:

7

NIELSTEIN:

8

FEMALE:

9

NIELSEN: I

[0

FEMALE:

LI

PETERSON:

L2

FEMALE:

13

KNOWLTON:

L4

FEMALE:

Stanford... Steele

L5

STEELE:

I

[6

FEMALE:

Stevenson

17

STEVENSON:

18

FEMALE:

19

SWAZZLE: I

10

FEMALE:

Nielstein
I
Nielsen

Peterson
I
Knowlton
I

I

Swazzle

Valentine

1

VALENTINE:

I

2

FEMALE:

Waddit

3

WADDIT:

I

4

FEMALE:

(inaudible) Bailey

5

BAILEY:

I

6

MALE:

Senate Bill 188 has 27 I votes, no nay votes two being absent

7

Passes to the third reading count. Excuse me, passes to the house for their consideration.

8

Next bill sub
•Ha>tse^ VLU

9
10
11

i7 <r

-
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MR. PRESIDENT: (inaudible) House Bill 125.
FEMALE:

J

House Bill 125 endangerment of child or elder person with

controlled substance or precursor representative Beck, Senator Julander.

12

MR PRESIDENT: Senator Julander.

13

JULANDER:

Thank you Mr. President, we've had uh, several discussions

14

on this bill and we're trying to correct two oversights that had been in the uh, code um, to

15

the present. The first problem was, was the awkward proof of requirement and we solved

16

that yesterday with Senator uh, Valentines amendment, uh and um, the other was the um,

17

the section that contains no exemption for drugs which are, are administered in

18

accordance with the prescription from a physician. So unless there are any questions.

19
20

MR. PRESIDENT: Any questions for Senator Julander on this bill? ... See non
Senator.

14

1

JULANDER:

(inaudible) with the question that uh,

2

MR PRESIDENT: Question is should House Bill 125 pass? Roll call vote.

3

FEMALE:

Senator Allen .. Ron Allen

4

ALLEN:

I

5

FEMALE:

Blancum.. (inaudible)

6

MALE:

I

7

FEMALE:

Brothers

8

BROTHERS:

9

FEMALE:

Davis

10

DAVIS:

1

11

FEMALE:

Demitrige

12

DEMITRIGE:

13

FEMALE:

14

EASTMAN: I

15

FEMALE:

Ericks

16

ERICKS:

I

17

FEMALE:

Gregra

18

GREGRA: 1

19

FEMALE:

20

HALEROW:

I

I

Eastman

Hale... Halerow
I

15

1

FEMALE:

Hickman ...Hillyard

2

HILLYARD:

3

FEMALE:

4

JOKUMA: I

5

FEMALE:

6

JULANDER:

7

FEMALE:

8

KNUDSON: I

9

FEMALE:

Maine

10

MAINE:

I

11

FEMALE:

Peterson

12

PETERSON:

13

FEMALE:

Polton

14

POLTON:

I

15

FEMALE:

Spencer

16

SPENCER: I

17

FEMALE:

Steele

18

STEELE:

I

19

FEMALE:

Stevenson

20

STEVENSON:

I
Jokums

Julander
I
Knudson

I

I

1

FEMALE:

Swazzle

2

SWAZZLE: I

3

FEMALE:

4

VALENTINE:

5

FEMALE:

6

CLAUDERTZ:

7

FEMALE:

8

WALKER: I

9

FEMALE

Wright

0

WRIGHT:

I

1

FEMALE:

(inaudible)

2

MALE:

I

.3

MR. PRESIDENT: House Bill 125 is received 261 votes no nay votes three being

Valentine
I

Claudertz
I

Walker

[4

absent, passes. Will be referred back to the House for further consideration as it was

15

amended. We'll now go to

17
/ S / ' . A ^
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